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This paper seeks to analyse a case in which firms choose to divide their R&D expenditures into 
two components: competitive R&D and Joint-Venture R&D.  The analysis is motivated by the fact 
that R&D outputs can have different degrees of non-excludability.  It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that a firm will allocate a part of its funds to competitive R&D; this is the case in areas in 
which research is non-excludable to a smaller degree, and part of it to Joint-Venture R&D, in cases 
where R&D output is highly non-excludable.  This issue is addressed in a three-stage model of a 
duopoly, in which joint-venture R&D and competitive R&D are chosen in the first and second 
stages while the quantity of the product is chosen in the third stage.  The results confirm that 
allocation of expenditure to the joint-venture component increases as the spillover rate on the 
competitive component increases.  Furthermore, if firms are able to coordinate their joint-venture 
R&D levels, there is greater incentive to increase this allocation.  However, for these results to 
obtain, it is crucial that the two types of R&D are chosen sequentially; a simultaneous choice 




1.  Introduction 
In recent years, the analysis of cooperative and non-cooperative research and development 
(henceforth R&D) in the presence of spillovers has been an active area of research.  Much of this 
literature has been based on the approach taken by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), who 
examine this issue in the framework of a two-stage model of a duopoly, in which cooperative or 
non-cooperative research levels are chosen in the first stage, while in the second stage firms 
engage in Cournot competition in the product market.  Their model is characterized by the 
presence of a positive externality created by a firm’s R&D activity; part of the information about a 
completed R&D project costlessly leaks to its rivals who are consequently able to benefit from the 
resulting cost reductions as well.   
    This externality has been referred to as an output spillover in subsequent literature, in contrast to 
an input spillover in Kamien et al. (1992), which leads to leakage of information at the research 
stage before the innovation takes place.  (See, for example, Amir (2000), Martin (2002), and 
Hauenschild (2003), among others.) Kamien et al. also distinguish between the possibility of R&D 
coordination and information sharing.  In the presence of information sharing, it is postulated that the spillover effect increases and a research joint venture is formed.  In addition they analyse the 
case of differentiated products and Bertrand price competition in the product market.  In 
Hauenschild (2002) the basic d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model and the Kamien et al. 
(1992) model, was extended to include the possibility of uncertain R&D outcomes. 
   In all of the above cases, it is implicitly assumed, that investment of resources in non-cooperative 
R&D precludes investment in cooperative R&D, or in research joint ventures, and vice versa.  In 
the real world, it is possible to conceive of situations in which firms allocate part of their R&D 
expenditure to cooperative or joint research, while part of R&D is conducted non-cooperatively.  
To motivate why this may be the case, we focus on a particular feature of R&D output, which is 
also typical of public goods.  This is the partial non-excludability of this output.  The extent of 
non-excludability is determined by legal measures available to make this output appropriable as 
well as the nature of this output.  Here, we wish to emphasize that certain types of research yield 
output that may be appropriable to a greater degree than other types of research.  The R&D by a 
firm typically involves research that yields both types of output – i.e., part of which is not 
appropriable in the sense that it involves a large spillover, and a part which can be kept secret, or 
protected by patents.  It is therefore reasonable to expect that a firm will allocate some of its funds 
to non-cooperative R&D, in areas of research in which there is high appropriability, while in other 
areas it may have incentive to invest in a research joint venture. 
      The purpose of this paper is to analyse a case in which firms choose to divide their R&D 
expenditure into two components: competitive R&D and joint-venture R&D.  This issue is 
addressed in the framework of a three stage game of duopoly competition.  Two cases are 
considered.  In the first stage, the two firms form a research joint venture and can decide to 
cooperate by choosing joint-venture R&D levels to maximize joint profits, or alternatively act like 
Cournot competitors, although information resulting from R&D in this stage is fully shared in 
either case.  The two cases are similar to what Kamien et al. refer to as “research joint venture 
cartelization” and “research joint venture competition” respectively.  Competitive R&D is chosen 
in the second stage, in which firms take the joint-venture R&D levels in the first stage as given.  In 
the third stage the quantities of the homogeneous product produced by the two firms are chosen, 
while R&D levels chosen in the previous stages are taken as given.  There is Cournot competition 
in the last two stages.  Competitive R&D is characterized by a fixed spillover less than one, while 
in the case of joint venture R&D; the spillover is set equal to one. 
    Results of this analysis indicate that lower appropriability of the competitive component of 
R&D motivates firms to allocate a larger component of their expenditure to the joint-venture 
component.  This motivation is enhanced if the firms are able to coordinate first-stage R&D in 
order to maximize joint profits.  However the crucial element underlying these results is the three 
stage nature of the game.  Simultaneous choice of joint-venture and competitive R&D would, of 
course, result in a corner solution in which firms only invest in competitive R&D. 
   In what follows, Section 2 describes and solves the model, which is a simple extension of the 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) framework.  In this section we also use some numerical simulations to examine parameter combinations in which joint-venture R&D exceeds competitive 
R&D and vice versa. Section 3 summarizes the results and concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
There are two firms in the industry, characterized by the inverse demand function  bQ a D − =
−1 , 
where  2 1 q q Q + =  is the total quantity produced in this industry,  1 q and  2 q are the quantities 
produced by firms 1 and 2 respectively, and a and b are positive constants.  The cost function of 
firm i, i=1, 2,  j i ≠ is represented by 





















i x are the competitive and joint-venture components of firm i’s R&D expenditure.  
The joint-venture R&D levels are chosen prior to the competitive R&D levels, which in turn are 








i ≤ + + + β , 
b a Q / ≤ ,  a A < < 0 , and  1 0 < < β .  The notation used here is similar to the d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) framework; β  is the cost reduction experienced by a firm due to a unit of the 
rival’s competitive R&D expenditure.  For a firm’s joint-venture expenditure, the spillover is set 








i x γ , for 
the competitive and joint-venture components respectively.  The parameter γ  is assumed to be 
positive. 
      In the product market, firms act as Cournot competitors and maximize individual profits 
conditional on the first and second stage R&D levels.  Firm i’s profit in the third stage is then 
given by 
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Standard derivations imply the following equilibrium quantities: 
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Furthermore, the total quantity produced in the market is given by 
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   In the second stage of the game, firms choose the level of competitive R&D, by maximizing 
second stage profits, which can be written as: 
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Note that if we set joint-venture R&D levels equal to zero, the second stage profits here 
correspond to the first stage profits of the two-stage d’Aspremont and Jacquemin model. 
   The symmetric solution in this stage yields 
c x1 and 
c x2 as functions of joint-venture R&D levels in 
the first stage:          ) 6 ( ]. [
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      Now consider the case in which the firms choose joint-venture R&D levels to maximize 
individual profits.  In this case, although the information resulting from R&D efforts is shared, 
firms do not cooperate in the sense of coordinating R&D levels.  The solution for first-stage joint-
venture R&D levels in this case is given by: 
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  In the second three-stage game, the firms also coordinate their joint-venture R&D levels in order 
to maximize joint profits.   Again, we derive the symmetric solution: 
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   Comparing the coordinated and uncoordinated joint-venture R&D levels, it is clear that joint 
R&D is higher in the case where R&D in the first stage is chosen to maximize joint profits.  As 
competitive R&D is increasing in joint-venture R&D, this implies that competitive R&D levels 
will also be higher in the latter case.  Consequently, output levels will also be higher.  These 
results are analogous to those obtained in two-stage models of R&D competition. 
   It is difficult to analyse under what conditions joint-venture R&D is larger than competitive 
R&D chosen in the second stage.  However, numerical simulations based on parameter 
combinations consistent with the second order conditions clearly illustrate what would be expected 
on the basis of intuition.  First, let us analyse the case in which we have uncoordinated joint-
venture R&D in the first stage.  Figure 1 presents competitive and joint-venture R&D levels as a 
function of  β , the spillover on competitive R&D.  Joint-venture R&D levels are represented by 
the solid line, while competitive R&D levels are represented by the dashed line. As indicated by 
this figure, the competitive R&D levels typically decrease as β increases, while joint-venture R&D 
levels increase as β increases
1.  For large values of  β , joint-venture R&D levels exceed 
competitive R&D levels
2.  Intuitively, as the degree of excludability of the competitive component 
decreases, the firm has greater incentive to engage in joint-venture R&D. 
   Now consider the case in which firms coordinate their first-stage joint-venture R&D levels as a 
cartel.  Figure 2 illustrates the results for this case, which are similar to case in which there is no 
coordination.  However, in this case, joint-venture R&D exceeds competitive for much smaller 
values of the spillover parameter β
3.  Again, the intuition is straightforward: if the firms are able 
to form a cartel, there is greater incentive to internalize the externality created, in the interest of 
higher joint profits. 
                                                 
1  This can be shown to be true for parameter values consistent with the second order conditions.  
2  In the case where there is no coordination of first stage R&D, this typically happens for values of 
β greater than 0.9.  
3 In this case the critical value of β is typically around 0.15.    It is important to emphasize here that these results are possible only if the game is played in three 
stages.  It can be easily shown that in the two-stage variant of this model, in which competitive and 
joint-venture R&D levels are chosen simultaneously in the first stage, there is a prisoner’s 
dilemma: firms only invest in competitive R&D. 
 
3.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyses the case in which firms choose to divide their R&D expenditures into two 
components, depending on the degree of excludability of different types of R&D activity.  This 
issue is addressed in a simple extension of the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1998) model.   
Specifically, we construct a three-stage model of R&D competition, in which firms choose joint-
venture R&D, competitive R&D, and product output levels respectively in the first second and 
third stage of the game.  As expected, the results confirm that allocation of expenditure to the 
joint-venture component increases as the spillover rate on the competitive component increases.  
Furthermore, if firms are able to coordinate their joint-venture R&D levels, there is greater 
incentive to increase this allocation.  However, it is essential that the choice of different types of 
R&D levels is played as a sequential game. 
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Figure 1: Competitive and Joint-Venture R&D as a function of β . (Cournot Competition in all three 
stages) 
-------  Competitive R&D;   ___Joint-Venture R&D. 
  Other parameters: a=2; A=1; b=2;  2 = γ .  
                                                  Spillover rate ( )→ β   
























Figure 2: Competitive and Joint-Venture R&D as a function of β . (Cooperation in the first stage) 
-------  Competitive R&D;   ___Joint-Venture R&D. 
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